



Origen (185-254) is probably the most celebrated advocate of the
belief that all free creatures will finally be restored to God. Although
the Church has traditionally rejected universalism as a heresy, there
has been a resurgence of the doctrine in our day. Given the
importance of Origen as a historical precedent for modern
universalism,' his version of the doctrine deserves specific
examination. The focus of this paper will be Origen's conception of
universalism as he developed it in the First Principles.
I
Before we proceed, let us make some brief observations on
historical background. Origen wrote First Principles during his time
in Alexandria, where he served as head of the Catechetical School
from 203 to 230. Alexandria was an important intellectual center,
and boasted the best library in the world. As a resident of this city,
Origen naturally encountered various competing philosophies and
religions.
He familiarized himself with Greek thinking in order to meet his
opponents on their own ground. In this vein, he attended the lectures
of Ammonius Saccas, who was the teacher ofPlotinus, the great neo-
platonist philosopher.^ The impact of Greek philosophy on his
thinking can be discerned in Origen's writings. His heretical views are
often traced, at least in part, to his desire to reconcile platonic and
neo-platonic philosophy with Christianity.^ We must keep in mind
that he lived prior to the period of the Ecumenical Councils, and did
not have the benefit of their decisions to guide his thinking and
writing.
In this later period, Origen's doctrine ofuniversalism was officially
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condemned, along with his other aberrant views. However, the
details of his condemnation have been a matter of much historical
debate.
The issue is complicated by conflicting data, which I will not
attempt to sort out since my purpose lies elsewhere. It is agreed that
about 543 the emperor Justinian published a refutation of Origen
including a list of anathemas. Moreover, the emperor directed
Mennas, the patriarch of Constantinople, to convene a synod which
also condemned Origen. The controversy centers on whether or not
he was condemned a decade later at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in
553.
Much of the dispute involves a series of 15 anathemas, which were
discovered by Peter Lambeck of Vienna in the 17th century. The
heading of the anathemas assigns them to the Fifth Council, but the
authenticity of the heading has been challenged.'* There is evidence
which indicates that these 15 anathemas should be attributed to the
synod conducted by Mennas in 543, although it is by no means
conclusive.
Even if the 15 anathemas were not adopted by the Fifth
Ecumenical Council, the fact remains that Origen was condemned by
name as a heretic in the 11th Canon of that Council.^ But this has
been accounted for by some as a later interpolation.
However, for now we must leave this matter to the historians, and
move on.^
II
There is, of course, material dealing with universalism in other
works of Origen besides the First Principles. However, there are at
least three reasons why this book alone is sufficient for a valid study
of his version of that doctrine.
First, although Origen wrote First Principles when he was only
about 30 years old, there is no reason to believe that he modified his
opinions in any significant way.^ So we are not dealing with views he
later repudiated.
Second, his doctrine of universalism is organically related to his
thinking as a whole. It cannot be isolated from other aspects of his
theology. Since the First Principles is "the most complete and
characteristic expression of Origen's opinions"* we can examine
universalism there in its broader context.
Third, universal salvation is one of the "main themes" which "run
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throughout the whole of the work"^ We do not have to rely on a few
passing references to the doctrine in forming our interpretation.
There is also one noteworthy drawback however. The original
Greek version of the book is almost completely lost. What we have is
the Latin translation of Rufinus prepared about 150 years after
Origen's original edition, and a few fragments of a translation by
Jerome. The problem is that Rufmus took liberties in his translation,
partly to smooth out Origen's heretical views. Therefore, we have to
reckon with the fact that what we read is not always the thought of
Origen.
Because of the general structure of the First Principles, Origen is
often recognized as the first systematic theologian of the Christian
church. But that should not be pressed too far, because the
arrangement of the material is not always logical. Moreover, it is
sadly deficient in whole areas, one of which is soteriology.'o
Nevertheless, Origen should be commended for realizing that
Christianity must be given a holistic interpretation in order to
compete with other world views."
In the preface of his book, Origen begins by assuming the basic
elements of the faith on the authority of the church. But given these
definite limits, he sees room for speculation. In the four books which
follow, he not infrequently admits the tentative nature of his theories.
Book one begins with a discussion of the persons of the Trinity.
There follows a treatment of other basic doctrines such as the fall, the
nature of rational beings, and the final consummation of the world.
The second book deals with the beginning of the world, the
incarnation, resurrection and divine punishment. Arguments which
show that the God of the law is also the God of the gospel are given to
refute dualism. Book three opens with a lengthy defense of free will.
A discourse on the devil and other "opposing powers" appropriately
follows. The book concludes with another discussion of creation and
the end of the world. Repetition in the first three books is
considerable. The last book has to do with theories of the inspiration
and interpretation of Scripture. The well-known allegorical method
of interpretation is expounded. The final section of First Principles is
a summary of the key doctrines already discussed.
Ill
As noted above, Origen's concept of universalism cannot be
grasped without engaging to some extent the complexity of his
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thought as a whole. Universalism is the outcome of several motifs in
his theology. I hope the following discussion will make that
apparent.
Let us start by noting this dictum of Origen's:
For the end is always like the beginning: and therefore as
there is one end to all things, so ought we to understand that
there was one beginning; and as there is one end to many
things, so there spring from one beginningmany differences
and varieties, which again ... are recalled to one end, which
is like unto the beginning. '2
Here we have, in capsulated form, his doctrine of universalism. In a
nutshell, the end is a return to the beginning.
Origen's beliefs about the beginning are obviously very important.
At this crucial point his thinking betrays a dependence on neo-
platonic philosophy. '3 In a famous argument, he maintains that
creation is eternal, and necessarily so.
As no one can be a fatherwithout having a son, nor amaster
without possessing a servant, so even God cannot be called
omnipotent unless there exist those over whom He may
exercise His power. . . But if there was never a time when He
was not omnipotent, of necessity those things by which He
receives that title must also exist; and He must always have
had those over whom He exercised power, and which were
governed by Him either as king or prince. .
If omnipotence entails creatures, then God has always had creatures
or He has not always been omnipotent. But if He has not always been
so, then He is not immutable, which is absurd.
Does this mean that this universe as we know it has always existed?
No, for Origen did not believe that matter is co-eternal with God.
Original creation for him consisted of a finite number of intellectual
beings. "In that commencement, then, we are to suppose that God
created so great a number of rational or intellectual creatures ... as
He foresaw would be sufficient. It is certain that He made them
according to some definite number, predetermined by Himself. "'5
Moreover, each of these beings was created exactly alike. "For it is
established by many declarations that all rational creatures are of
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one nature. "'6 Had not all creatures been created equal, God would
not be just.
In the beginning, then, creation was a perfect harmony of
intellectual beings in unionwith God. Origen's conception of this can
be better understood by looking at his description of the end (since
"the end is always like the beginning"). He anticipates a final state of
mystical union in which God will be one with His creatures. Origen
finds this idea in two key passages of Scripture. The first is John 17:24
which reads: "Father, I will that where I am, these may also be with
Me: and as Thou and I are one, they also may be one in Us." The
other key passage is I Corinthians 15:24-28, particularly verse 28
which looks to a time when God will be "all in all".
When that state arrives, our likeness with God will advance "from
being merely similar to become the same".'"' Furthermore, "it maybe
understood as a rational inference that where all are one, there will
no longer be any diversity. "'^ Those who have become "united to
God shall have been made one spirit with Him."'' It is apparent that
the lines separating creature from Creator are not clearly drawn here,
if at all. This final state is unity indeed.
Now having examined the beginning and the end, what is to be said
of the middle? If the key word describing the beginning and end is
unity, the key word describing the middle is diversity. The question
is, how did this diversity come to be? There are two basic factors
which explain the present diversity. The first is free will and the
second is God's providence.
As noted above, free will is an important element of Origen's
system. Along with rationality, it is essential in all beings. Moral
qualities, on the other hand, are accidental in creatures. Whereas
God is good in His essential nature, we are good or evil contingent
upon our choices. "And since all are possessed of free will, and may
of their own accord admit either of good or evil . . . angels may
become men or demons, and again from the latter theymay rise to be
men or angels. "^o
Because rational beings chose to do evil, this world with all its
diversity was brought into existence. Angels, demons and men have
been given their present status according to the deserts of their
former choices. This physical world was created for those who fell so
far as to require bodily existence.2' It was preceded by other worlds,
and will likewise be followed by other worlds. Origen expresses his
view of the fall in the form of a question.
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. . . what other cause, as we have already said are we to
imagine for so great a diversity in the world, save the
diversity and variety in the movements and declensions of
those who fell from that primeval unity and harmony in
which they were at first created by God. . .
The justice of God is at stake here for Origen. Unless our lot in this
life is a consequence of guilt acquired prior to birth, God is not a just
governor.23
So the diversity of this world cannot be fully explained without
reference to divine providence. "For God must be believed to do and
order all things and at all times according to His judgment. "^^ Only
He is truly able to recognize the merits of each individual's choices.
Thus, free will plus divine providence accounts for diversity and
eliminates any basis for charging God with injustice.
And these are the causes, in my opinion, why that world
presents the aspect of diversity, while Divine Providence
continues to regulate each individual according to the
variety of his movements or of his feelings and purpose. On
which account the creator will neither appear to be unjust in
distributing ... to everyone according to his merits; norwill
the happiness or unhappiness of each one's birth, or
whatever be the condition that falls to his lot, be deemed
accidental; nor will different creators, or souls of different
natures, be believed to exist.25
Divine punishment must be understood in terms ofprovidence. As
such, it is not eternal separation from God; rather, it is a means of
restoration to Him. Origen's concern is to find a way to understand
God's anger which is worthy of Him.^* But sin is not taken lightly.
Some creatures will have to undergo severe punishment and
discipline before they can be restored. God is depicted as a physician
employing penal measures in order to "remove the defects of our
souls, which they had contracted from their different sins and crimes.
. . . By which certainly it is understood that the fury of God's
vengeance is profitable for the purgation of souls. "^'^
The cure may take time, but since we are rational creatures and
God is wise in His application of the remedy, it will eventually come
according to His plan. "For He made the thinking principle immortal
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in its nature, and kindred to Himself; and the rational soul is not, as
in this life, excluded from cure."28 "For nothing is impossible to the
Omnipotent, nor is anything incapable of restoration to its Creator:
for He made all things that they might exist, and those things which
were made for existence cannot cease to be."^' Thus Origen can offer
this hopeful account of how God will bring to pass the final
restoration of all creatures:
And this result must be understood as being brought about,
not suddenly, but slowly and gradually, seeing that the
process of amendment and correction will take place
imperceptibly in the individual instances during the lapse of
countless and unmeasured ages, some outstripping others,
and tending by a swifter course towards perfection, while
others again follow close at hand, and some again a longway
behind; and thus through the numerous and uncounted
orders of progressive beings who are being reconciled to
God from a state of enmity, the last enemy is finally reached,
who is called death, so that he also may be destroyed, and no
longer be an enemy.^o
IV
As observed above, Origen freely admitted the speculative quality
of some of his judgments. At the beginning of his discussion of "The
End or Consummation" in Book I, he remarked: "These subjects
indeed, are treated by us with great solicitude and caution, in the
manner rather of an investigation and discussion, than in that of
fixed and certain decision. "3' In appreciation of this unusual
modesty in a theologian, the following criticisms are offered.
First, I would dispute from the outset Origen's opinion that
universal salvation is a matter for speculation. In his preface, he
distinguished those matters in Scripture which are clearly given from
those which are open for discussion. Obviously Origen did not think
that universalism is clearly ruled out by Scripture. Here the question
involves the reformation issue of the external clarity of Scripture.32 jf
we have a clear word from God that some will be eternally lost, the
case is closed. I would concur with the vast consensus of tradition
that we have such a word.
Second, Origen does not give sufficient place to the work ofChrist
for our salvation. In his Christology, Jesus' soul was one of the souls
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originally created by God. It did not fall with the others, and was
therefore chosen to be united to the divine Logos, like white-hot iron
is united with fire. 33 Jesus serves as our example, and by imitating
Him, we too may "be made partakers of the divine nature" 3^ We
obtain salvation only by obedience and His death teaches us
obedience to the Father. 35 This hardly does justice to the biblical
doctrine of salvation by grace.
Third, Origen's Christology suggests an inconsistency with his
universalism. That soul which became united with Christ is said to
have attained immutability. By firmness of purpose and an
indistinguishable warmth of love it "destroyed all susceptibility for
alteration and change; and that which formerly depended upon the
will was changed by the power of long custom into nature. "3^ This
seems to raise the possibility of irreversible evil. If it is possible to
become immutably joined to God by the "power of long custom"why
is it not possible to become irreparably separated from Him by the
same means?
Fourth, a consistent conception of free will poses difficulties, and
Origen appears to be aware of this. He concedes that there are those
"whose conversion is in a certain degree demanded and extroted."3^
Is this not tantamount to admitting that some will never willingly
submit to God? Furthermore, Origen allows for the possibility of
falling away from God again, after having been restored. 38 This
opens the door to a perpetual cycle of falling away and restoration. In
this precarious state of affairs, God may never achieve His final
purpose. This is also inconsistent with his Christological theory in
which a soul may become irreversibly united with God.
Fifth, I do not think Origen has adequately reckoned with the
irrational nature of evil. It is emphasized throughout the First
Principles that we are rational creatures, although fallen. Since we
are akin to God, we should eventually see the wisdom of obeying
Him. But as T.F. Torrance has pointed out, "sin is illogical, and by its
very factual existence cannot be rationalised without being
rationalised away",39 Origen's confidence in the rationality of fallen
creatures vitiates the force of sin.
Finally, the doctrine ofnecessary creation contains a serious error.
If God creates out of necessity, it is a small step to say that He also
saves His fallen creatures out of necessity. If He is almighty because
He created the world, it seems reasonable to say He is good because
He saves the world. If God's nature is in some sense bound up with
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His creatures, then His fate is not independent of theirs.
Origen's mistake, as Florovsky points out, is a failure to make a
distinction between the will of God and the essence of God. "The idea
of the world has its basis not in the essence but in the will ofGod."'^^
God was free to create or not to create without any alteration of His
nature. To argue otherwise "leads to raising the world, at, least the
'intelligible world' to an improper height".'*'
There is a connection between universalism and the tendency to
overestimate the world's importance for God. Peter Geach counters
this tendency:
We cannot think properly about Hell ifwe do not start from
a right view about God. God has no need of us as we need
Him; no need of us, or of our love. . . . For God a billion
rational creatures are as dust in the balance; if a billion
perish, God suffers no loss, Who can create what He wills
with no effort or cost by merely thinking of it.'*^
Since God does not need us. He is under no compulsion to save us. If
we are lost. He is not the loser.
Barth rejected necessary universalism for a similar reason,
according to Joseph Bettis.
For the universalist, since God is love, all men must finally
be saved. But Barth rejects the common premise that God's
love is defined in terms ofwhat it does for men This is to
say that God's essence is not self defined, but is defined in
relation to men The problem is not that universalism ties
God to all men but that it ties God to men at all.'*^
In connection with the above, God is not good because He saves men
any more than He is almighty because He created the world. Rather,
He is both good and almighty in His essential Being. He suffers no
diminution if His creatures perish.
I think it is clear that one's conception of God's relation to the
world will shape the rest of his theology. Indeed, "the problematic of
creation ... is the central problem of Christian philosophy � the
problem of the coexistence and coagency of the infinite and the finite,
the necessary and the contingent, the eternal and temporal, the
absolute and the relative".^ Origen went astray at this most crucial
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point. This suggests that the most serious objection to his doctrine of
universahsm is that it begins with a deficient view of God. �
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